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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This court has appellate jurisdiction over this case,
which was transferred to it by the Utah Supreme Court, pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j), 1953 as amended.
This appeal arises from an action for the recovery of
the value of real property which plaintiff, Mary Jean
Freebairn, sold in 1971 (the "property") to defendant J.
Russell Scott.

Plaintiff's appeal is from a decision of no

cause of action.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Is plaintiff entitled to annul the 1971 sale of

her property to Mr. Scott, as a matter of law, for the reason
that:

(a) after the sale of the property Mr. Scott was

appointed guardian over plaintiff; (b) Mr. Scott did not obtain
judicial approval, as guardian for plaintiff, of plaintiff's
signing a deed for property which she had conveyed before the
guardianship proceedings were initiated; and (c) plaintiff
signed the deed to the property after a guardian was appointed,
although she executed the Earnest Money Agreement and closed
the sale of the property before the guardianship proceedings?
2.

Is there sufficient evidence to support the trial

court's findings of fact that:

(a) plaintiff had the capacity

to contract and convey her property when she sold it to Mr.
Scott; and (b) the sale to Mr. Scott was fair and defendants
did not exercise fraud or undue influence over plaintiff?
-1-

3.

Can this court impose a constructive trust on the

proceeds of Mr. Scott's sale of the property he purchased from
plaintiff where there are no findings by the trial court, or
evidence in support thereof, pertaining to the elements for a
constructive trust?

CODIFIED LAW REQUIRING INTERPRETATION
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes,
ordinances, rules or regulations whose interpretation would be
determinative of any issue, legal or factual, presently before
this court.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
1.

Mary Jean Freebairn, plaintiff, and defendant J.

Russell Scott are first cousins who separately inherited real
property from their uncle near the cottonwood canyons.
(Memorandum Decision & Judgement ("Judgment"), Findings of Fact
U 1; Brief of Plaint iff/Appellant Mary Jean Freebairn
("Appellant's Brief") pp. 6-7, and Appendix I.)
2.

During the 1960's, plaintiff sold 15 acres of her

property to Mr. Scott in order to obtain money to pay her
debts.

(Judgment, Findings of Fact IT 3; Reporter's Transcript

on Appeal ("Record") pp. 10-15; Appellant's Brief pp. 9-10.)

-2-

3.

In 1968, plaintiff entered into a trust agreement

with her brother Samuel Freebairn and his wife, Agnes
Freebairn, for the purpose of developing plaintiff's property.
Under the terms of the trust agreement, Samuel and Agnes
Freebairn agreed to purchase the remainder of plaintiff's
property, with the property subject to a trust agreement with
Security Title Comany, and with payments made on a
release" basis.

f?

lot

(Judgment, Findings of Fact Hlf 4, 7; Record

pp. 27-28, 213-14, 520-24, Exhibit 32-P; Appellant's Brief pp.
10-11.)
4.

Samuel and Agnes Freebairn encumbered the land by

a mortgage in order to obtain money to finance the development
of the property.

Samuel Freebairn, however, died shortly

thereafter in 1969, and Agnes Freebairn was unable to develop
the property or make the payments on the mortgage.

(Judgment,

Findings of Fact HH 5-6; Record pp. 522-25; Appellant's Brief
p. 13.)
5.

Plaintiff and Agnes Freebairn, facing the risk of

losing the property, agreed to sell the property, and both
contacted Le R Burton, a real estate agent, to have the
property offered for sale.

(Judgment, Findings of Fact

HH 10-11; Record pp. 525-27, 676-80; Appellant's Brief p. 14.)
6.

Plaintiff and Agnes Freebairn established an

asking price for the property and had Mr. Burton list the

-3-

property for sale in the multiple listing book and advertise it
by sign and in a newspaper of state-wide circulation,
(Judgment, Findings of Fact ITU 11-12; Record pp. 525-33,
680-91.)
7.

After the property was unsuccessfully offered for

sale for a period of time, plaintiff sought out Mr. Scott to
purchase the property.

Mr. Scott initially rejected the offer,

but later agreed to purchase the property to help plaintiff and
Agnes Freebairn with their financial problems.

On January 13,

1971, after no other buyers could be found, plaintiff had Mr.
Burton prepare an earnest money agreement for the sale and
purchase of the property.

Mr. Scott signed the agreement,

agreeing to pay plaintiff's asking price.

The agreement also

provided that the proceeds from the sale would be placed in a
"protective trust" for the purpose of safeguarding the assets
and welfare of plaintiff.

(Judgment, Findings of Fact HIT 13,

15-16; Record pp. 68-88, 527-33, 682-97, Exhibit 12-P.)
8.

Prior to the closing of the sale, plaintiff and

Mr. Scott consulted with LaMar Duncan, an attorney, regarding
the creation of a trust for the sale proceeds.

Mr. Duncan,

however, recommended that instead of a trust, a guardianship be
created.

Both plaintiff and Mr. Scott relied on Mr. Duncan's

representations concerning the creation of a guardianship in
lieu of a trust.

(Judgment, Findings of Fact UU 16,30; Record

pp. 90-94, 698-700, 784-86.)
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9.

The closing for the sale of the property took

place on March 1, 1971 which was before the guardianship
proceedings were initiated.

At the closing, plaintiff did not

execute a deed because the property was still subject to the
1968 trust agreement with Security Title Company.

(Judgment,

Findings of Fact H1T 17, 32-33; Record pp. 106-11; Appellant's
Brief p. 17.)
9.

On March 22, 1971, the guardianship was created,

with Mr. Scott named as guardian.

On March 23, 1971, the 1968

trust was terminated, and plaintiff executed a deed to the
property.

(Judgment, Findings of Fact HH 9, 18-19, 34; Record

pp. 110-12, 393-97. )
10.

Plaintiff received all the payments from Mr.

Scott which she was owed for the sale of her property.
(Judgment, Findings of Fact IT 29; Record pp. 772-84.)
11.

During the time period immediately after

plaintiff sold her property, real estate values in the area
increased dramatically.

(Judgment, Findings of Fact IT 23;

Record pp. 420-23, 650-52; Complaint.)
12-

The trial court found, in rejecting plaintiff's

cause of action to have the sale annulled, that the sales price
paid by Mr. Scott was fair and consistent with the fair market

-5-

value at the time; that plaintiff was intelligent and educated;
that she factually understood the consequences of the sale of
her property; that she was competent to enter into a binding,
legal contract and to sell her property; and that defendants
did not take advantage of plaintiff, exercise undue influence
over her or perpetrate a fraud upon her by purchasing her
property.

(Judgment, Findings of Fact 1T1F 24-25, 27,

Conclusions IF IT 1, 3-4, 6; Record pp. 68-94, 481-97, 525-33,
614, 666-99.)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

In Point I of Appellant's Brief, plaintiff raises

three issues of law.

Each of these issues, and consequently

plaintiff's arguments in support thereof, are immaterial for
the reason that they are based on the faulty premise that
plaintiff sold her property when she signed the deed after a
guardian had been appointed.

Plaintiff does not challenge the

fact that she executed the Earnest Money Agreement and closed
the sale of her property before guardianship proceedings were
initiated.

Consequently, the sale was completed and the

property was conveyed before a guardian was appointed.
plaintiff's arguments, therefore, must fail.

Each of

Moreover,

plaintiff's arguments fail to correctly state or apply Utah
law.

A sale of property by a ward to her guardian, or the

-6-

ward's signing of a deed, does not render the transaction void
as a matter of law.

Plaintiff, therefore, has failed to

provide any relevant reason why the trial court's judgment
should not be affirmed.
2.

Plaintiff challenges certain findings of fact in

Points II and III of Appellant's Brief.

Plaintiff ignores the

complete record and only cites her own evidence, arguing that
the trial court should have found in her favor.

In addition to

her failure to apply the appropriate standard of appellate
review to the trial court's findings of fact, plaintiff is
unable to successfully argue that the findings are in error
because substantial evidence was presented at trial upon which
the trial court relied.

There are no grounds, therefore, for

disturbing the findings of the trial court.
3.

Finally, plaintiff argues in Point IV of

Appellant's Brief that this court should impose the remedy of a
constructive trust against the benefits Mr. Scott received from
later selling the property he purchased from plaintiff.

Not

only has plaintiff failed to show how she is entitled to such
relief, either before this court or the court below, but there
are no findings to support such a judgment, nor has plaintiff
pointed to sufficient evidence to support a finding that the
necessary elements for this remedy exist.

It is inappropriate

for plaintiff to seek relief from this court when there is no

-7-

factual basis for the relief sought.

Plaintiff's request for a

constructive trust, therefore, should be rejected.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
PLAINTIFF SOLD HER PROPERTY BEFORE A GUARDIAN
WAS APPOINTED OVER HER; THEREFORE, SHE HAS
FAILED TO RAISE A MATERIAL ISSUE OF LAW THAT
WOULD JUSTIFY ANY RELIEF SHE MAY BE SEEKING.
A.

MR. SCOTT PURCHASED PLAINTIFF'S PROPERTY BEFORE
HE WAS APPOINTED TO BE PLAINTIFF'S GUARDIAN, AND
EVEN IF HE HAD BEEN HER GUARDIAN, UTAH LAW WOULD
NOT VOID THE SALE AS A MATTER OF LAW.

Plaintiff first argues that the sale of her real
property to Mr. Scott is void, as a matter of law, because he
was plaintiff's guardian when the sale took place.
argument is erroneous for two reasons.

This

First, Mr. Scott was

not plaintiff's guardian when plaintiff sold him the property,
and second, Utah law would not render the sale void even if Mr.
Scott had been her guardian at the time of the sale.
The trial court found that plaintiff entered a valid
and legally binding contract to sell her property when she
executed the Earnest Money Agreement and when she in fact
closed the sale of the property before the guardianship
proceedings were initiated.

The only element of the entire

transaction which followed the institution of the guardianship
proceedings was the execution of the deed.

This act was only a

formality arising out of the binding obligation already created
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by the Earnest Money Agreement and the Closing Statement.
(Record pp. 68, 105-06; Exhibits 12-P, 16-P.)
In Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 1244 (Utah 1987),
the court stated that:
Under an installment land sale contract . . .
the vendee is treated as the owner of the
land . . . The doctrine of equitable
conversion characterizes the seller1s
interest as an interest in personalty and not
as one in realty, whereas the vendee's
interest under the executory contract is
deemed an interest in realty. [Citations
omitted.]
Id. at 1254-55.

This court entered a similar holding in Lach

v. Deseret Bank, 746 P.2d 802 (Utah App. 1987), wherein the
court stated that an earnest money agreement is a legally
binding executory contract under which the purchaser acquires
an interest in the property at the moment it is created, and
after which the purchaser is treated as the owner of the land.
Id. at 805.
The fact that the sale and conveyance occurred when
plaintiff executed her Earnest Money Agreement is further
supported by Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-1 (1953), which was in
effect during the ti.ne period critical to the transaction at
issue, which reads:
The term "conveyance'1' as used in this title
shall be construed to embrace every
instrument in writing by which any real
estate, or interest in real estate, is
created, aliened, mortgaged, encumbered or

-9-

assigned, except wills and leases for a term
not exceeding one year.
The Utah Supreme Court said of this broad statute that "real
property may be conveyed without the use of a deed.

Stucki v.

Ellis, 114 Utah 486, 493, 201 P.2d 486, 490 (1949).

Accord,

Bunnel v. Bills, 13 Utah 2d 83, 85, 368 P.2d 597, 599 (1962).
Pursuant to the above authorities, plaintiff legally
conveyed title to her property when she executed the Earnest
Money Agreement and closed the sale.

The fact that plaintiff

sold her property to defendant before the guardianship
proceedings were initiated renders plaintiff's argument
immaterial since Mr. Scott was not plaintiffTs guardian when he
purchased her property.
Plaintiff has not challenged the trial court's finding
that, 'f[t]he appointment of a guardian following the sale was
not in and of itself a basis for voiding the sale."
Conclusions U 2.)

(Judgment,

Plaintiff's argument ignores this finding.

Consequently, the question of law raised in plaintiff's
argument is meaningless.

Plaintiff's faulty presumption that

the sale took place during the guardianship, rather than before
it, carries over into plaintiff's other arguments as well, also
rendering them merit less.
In addition, even if Mr. Scott had been plaintiff's
guardian when she sold him her property, there is no Utah law
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to support plaintiff's contention that the sale would be void.
In Farley v. Farley, 19 Utah 2d 301, 431 P.2d 133 (1967),
which was the only Utah authority cited in support of
plaintiff's argument, the court held that the plaintiff was
acting as trustee for her minor children in asserting a quiet
title claim to property that was the subject of a divorce
decree.

This case clearly speaks of trustees who deal with the

res of the trust, and is distinguishable from the facts before
this court.

Most of plaintiff's other authorities are

distinguished for the same reason; they apply only to a
trustee's sale of trust property to the trustee.

No Utah law

has been found that holds a ward's sale of property to his
guardian to be void.
A guardian's purchase of property sold by the ward is
merely voidable.

See In re Howard's Estate, 133 Cal. 2d 535,

284 P.2d 966, 970 (1955) (citing 25 Am. Jur. 131, § 210).
Plaintiff miscites this case to support her argument that such
sales are void.

39 C.J.S. Guardian & Ward § 99 n. 68 (1976).

Moreover, additional text of this section of C.J.S., of which
plaintiff cites only a portion, reads that cases hold "that
such a purchase is not as a rule to be deemed void, but merely
voidable."

Other courts have likewise found transactions

between wards and guardians to be merely voidable, and not void
as a matter of law.

Matter of Conservatorship of Spindle, 733

-11-

P.2d 388, 390 (Okl. 1987) ("a transaction may be voidable, but
it is not automatically void"); In re Guardianship of Chandas,
18 Ariz. App. 583, 504 P.2d 524, 527 (1972) (de facto guardian
had burden to show that transaction was fair and free from
undue influence).
Although there is no Utah case law on the precise
issue raised by plaintiff, Utah law would follow the approach
expressed in the above-cited authorities.

Where a ward

transacts business with another, the Utah Supreme Cout has
stated that there is prima facie evidence of the incompetency
of the ward, which may be rebutted by evidence that the ward
was competent to transact the business.

Home Town Finance

Corp. v. Frank, 13 Utah 2d 26, 31, 368 P.2d 72, 76 (1962).
( See also infra Point IC.)

Hence if the ward transacts

business with his guardian, the transaction would be merely
voidable depending on whether the guardian could overcome the
presumption of incompetence.
Mr. Scott was not plaintiff's guardian at the time
plaintiff sold him her property.

In fact, guardianship

proceedings had not even been initiated when the sale closed.
Plaintiff's argument that the sale is void as a matter of law,
therefore, is without merit.

Yet even if the facts were

otherwise, Utah law would not render the transaction void.

-12-

B.

PLAINTIFF SOLD HER PROPERTY BEFORE THE
GUARDIANSHIP PROCEEDINGS, RENDERING
JUDICIAL AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTION
OF THE DEED UNNECESSARY.

Plaintiff argues next that the deed plaintiff executed
on March 23, 1971, after a guardian was appointed, was void for
lack of judicial authorization.

Again, this argument is

meritless for the reason that plaintiff sold her property
before a guardian had been appointed over her.

Moreover, the

ruling of the trial court below has the effect of authorizing
the sale and rendering this argument moot.
Each of the statutes cited by plaintiff deals with
"sales" of the ward's property.

Former Section 75-13-32 read

that a guardian must not "make any sale of [the ward's]
property without the order of the court."

[Emphasis added.]

Section 75-13-33 continued that "the guardian may sell . . .
real estate, upon obtaining an order of the court."
added.]

[Emphasis

Sections 75-13-41; 75-10-2 and 75-10-3 were similar.
Plaintiff sold her property to Mr. Scott on January

13, 1971, when plaintiff prepared the Earnest Money Agreement
and had Mr. Scott sign it.
1971.

The sale was closed on March 1,

Because the property was subject to a trust agreement

that had not yet been terminated, plaintiff could not deliver
the deed at closing.

On the very day the trust agreement was

terminated, however, plaintiff executed the deed.

-11-

Only the

execution of the deed occurred after a guardian was appointed.
Pursuant to the authorities cited in subsection A of this
Point, the sale and conveyance of plaintiff's property occurred
before plaintiff had a guardian; hence, there was no sale to be
judicially authorized when plaintiff signed the deed.
The trial court found that, "[t]he failure to obtain
court approval for the execution of a deed after the guardian
was appointed did not void the deed."
5.)

(Judgment, Conclusions IT

Plaintiff has not contested the court's findings that the

property was sold before she executed the deed.

Therefore,

plaintiff is unable to successfully argue that the sale
occurred when the deed was executed and that the act of signing
the deed needed judicial approval under the probate code.
Moreover, the validity of the transaction between
plaintiff and Mr. Scott was certainly confirmed by the trial
court below.

Consequently, title has now passed and plaintiff

is unable to claim the deed to be void.
§ 75-10-3, as cited by plaintiff.

See Utah Code Ann.

Plaintiff, therefore, is not

entitled to relief on the ground that the deed she executed was
void.
C.

PLAINTIFF DID NOT CONVEY TITLE TO HER
PROPERTY AFTER A GUARDIAN WAS
APPOINTED, AND EVEN IF SHE HAD, UTAH
LAW MERELY CREATES A REBUTTABLE
PRESUMPTION OF INCOMPETENCY WHEN A WARD
CONVEYS REAL PROPERTY.

-14-

Plaintiff also argues that she lacked the legal
capacity to convey title to her property because she signed the
deed after a guardian had been appointed for her.

Once again,

the fallacy of this argument lies in the erroneous premise that
the conveyance did not occur until the deed was signed.
Plaintiff conveyed title to her property when she executed the
Earnest Money Agreement and closed the sale, all of which
occurred before guardianship proceedings were initiated.
( See supra subsection A.)

The question of whether a ward

can legally convey real property after the guardianship
appointment is not even at issue on the facts of this case.
Even if plaintiff's performing the formality of
signing the deed after the sale was closed were to be construed
as the conveyance of the real property, the fact that a
guardian was appointed at that time would merely create a
presumption of incompetency; it would not render the conveyance
void as plaintiff suggests.

Plaintiff has not cited any Utah

authority for her argument that the conveyance would be void,
and she cannot because Utah law is expressly to the contrary.
The Utah Supreme Court has clearly held that the
appointment of a guardian is only prima facie evidence of
incompetency to contract and may be rebutted.

In Home Town

Finance Corp. v. Frank, 13 Utah 2d 26, 31, 368 P.2d 72, 76
(1962), the court held:
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[T]he appointment of a guardian is prima
facie evidence of the incompetency of the
ward, but . . . such prima facie [evidence]
may be rebutted by evidence which shows that
the ward was competent to understandingly
manage his business affairs and enter into
contracts at a time of making the alleged
contract in question.
Accord, Brisacher v. Tracy-Collins Trust Co., 277 F.2d 519,
522-23 (10th Cir. 1960) (construing Utah law). In Brisacher,
the court held that a person may meet the statutory definition
of the mental condition necessary to establish a guardianship
and nevertheless be competent to contract.

The court stated

that "the recognition by a court in Utah that a person is
incompetent to manage his affairs [under U.C.A. 75-13-20] is
not tantamount to an adjudication that he is incapable of
intelligently entering a contract."
522.

Brisacher, 277 F.2d at

In addition, the Utah Supreme Court has held that "the

test as to the capacity to execute a will, or trust deed, or
enter into other transactions, is quite different from the
requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 75-13-20 (1953), relating to
the appointment of a guardian."

Cornia v. Cornia, 546 P.2d

890, 893 (Utah 1976) (followed in Matter of Estate of Kesler,
702 P.2d 86, 96 (Utah 1985)).
The most plaintiff can gain by arguing that a guardian
was appointed when she conveyed her property is that defendants
would be required to prove she was competent at the time of the
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conveyance.

( See infra Point IIA.)

Hence, even if

plaintiff were held to have conveyed her property at the time
she performed the formality of signing the deed, which was
after the guardianship appointment, the conveyance would not be
void as a matter of law.

This issue, nevertheless, remains

immaterial since plaintiff conveyed ownership to the property
before guardianship proceedings were even initiated.
POINT II
PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE
TRIAL COURTfS FINDINGS OF FACT ARE CLEARLY
ERRONEOUS, AND SHE IS UNABLE TO DO SO FOR
THE REASON THAT SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
SUPPORTS THE FINDINGS.
In Points II and III of Appellant's Brief, plaintiff
presents questions of fact.

Namely, did she have the mental

capacity to sell her property? and did Mr. Scott unfairly
benefit from the sale?

Plaintiff argues before this court that

the trial court was clearly erroneous in finding that plaintiff
was competent to contract at the time she sold the property,
and that the sale was fair and without fraud or undue
influence.

Plaintiff, however, fails to apply this standard of

review, and her arguments merely recite evidence in her favor.
It is not the function of this court to hear
reargument on how the evidence should have been construed at
trial.

Neither will this court second guess the trial court's

findings and decision.

Cf. City Electric v. Industrial
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Indemnity Co., 683 P.2d 1053, 1059-60 (Utah 1984) (evidence is
construed in a light most favorable to the judgment of the
trial court).

In fact, this court will affirm a trial court's

decision whenever it can do so on a proper ground.

Bill Nay &

Sons Excavating v. Neeley Construction Co., 677 P.2d 1120,
1123 (Utah 1984).
In light of these principles, this court has stated,
with respect to its review of findings of fact, that:
In order to challenge the trial court's findings
of fact, an appellant must first ?fmarshal all the
evidence in support of the trial court's finding
and then demonstrate that even viewing it in the
light most favorable to the court below, the
evidence is insufficient to support the
findings." [Citation omitted.]
Henderson v. For-Shor Co., 757 P.2d 465, 468 (Utah App.
1988).

The Utah Supreme Court, in Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d

147 (Utah 1987), previously expressed the same standard of
appellate review to be applied to findings of fact.
Ashton, the court stated:
The court begins its analysis with the trial
court's findings of fact, not with an
appellant's view of the way he or she
believes the facts should have been found.
[Appellants] have not even begun to
seriously discuss the trial court's findings
that dispute their version of the facts. In
Scharf v. BMG Corp., we explained the duty
incumbent upon an appellant to mount a
successful challenge to a trial court's
findings of fact. An appellant must marshal
all of the evidence in support of the trial
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In

court's findings. Only then can we consider
whether those findings are "clearly
erroneous." Because [appellants] have
failed to make such a showing, the trial
court's findings will not be disturbed.
Id. at 150.
After mounting all the evidence in support of the
trial court's findings, plaintiff must also demonstrate how the
challenged findings, which are based on that evidence, are
clearly erroneous.

In Horton v. Horton, 695 P.2d 102 (Utah

1984), the court stated:
[T]he standard of appellate review in equity
cases, even where the level of proof from
the trial court is clear and convincing
evidence, is that of clear preponderance.
Therefore, where the evidence is in
conflict, this court will not upset the
findings in the trial court unless the
evidence so clearly preponderates against
them that this court is convinced that a
manifest injustice has been done.
Id. at 105.

In applying this standard, the court has stated

that it is mindful of the advantaged position of the trial
judge who sees and hears the witnesses.
P.2d 150, 152 (Utah 1981).

Jensen v. Brown, 639

Hence, there is not only indulged a

presumption of correctiness of the findings and judgment of the
trial judge, but the findings and judgment will not be reversed
where there is merely conflicting evidence.

Dang v. Cox

Corp., 655 P.2d 658, 660 (Utah 1982); Ovard v. Cannon, 600
P.2d 1246, 1248 (Utah 1979).
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The clearly erroneous standard has been codified
through the recent amendment to Rule 52 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.
(Utah 1986).

;See Adams v. Gubler, 731 P.2d 494, 496 n. 3

Rule 52(a) reads, in pertinent part, that:

Findings of fact, whether based on oral or
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard
should be given to the appointment of the
trial court to judge the credibility of the
witnesses.
The court has interpreted this language as follows:
[T]he content of Rule 52(a) fs ffclearly
erroneous1' standard . . . requires that if
the findings . . . are against the clear
weight of the evidence, or if the appellate
court otherwise reaches a definite and
confirm conviction that a mistake has been
made, the findings . . . will be set aside.
State in Interest of T.E. v. S.E., 761 P.2d 956, 957 (Utah
App. 1988) (quoting State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 19L, 193 (Utah
1987)).
Due to the plaintiff's failure to cite the evidence in
support of the trial court's findings of fact, plaintiff is now
unable to provide any argument showing how the findings are
erroneous.

Plaintiff has only cited to her own evidence, and

she merely reargues how her evidence would support a finding in
her favor.

This court, therefore, is unable to consider

whether the trial court's findings are based on sufficient
evidence.

As in Ashton, the trial court's findings should be
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affirmed, since plaintiff has failed to make the necessary
showing.
Even though plaintiff cannot have the findings of the
trial court set aside because of her failure to consider and
meet the appropriate standard of appellate review, the findings
of the trial court should not be disturbed for the additional
reason that they are amply supported by evidence presented at
trial.

Hence, plaintiff would be unable to show that the trial

court's findings are clearly erroneous even if she would have
tried to properly make such a showing.
A.

THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE FINDING THAT
PLAINTIFF WAS COMPETENT TO CONTRACT.

Plaintiff's arguments on the issue of her competency
to contract, made in Point II of Appellant's Brief, are
meritless.

First, she argues that defendants had the burden to

prove her competency because she was appointed a guardian at
the time she signed the deed, thereby creating a presumption of
incompetency.

However, as discussed under Point I, supra,

there is no dispute that she entered into a binding contract to
sell the property, which effectively transferred title and
ownership, before the guardianship proceedings were initiated.
Since she did not have a guardian at the time she actually
conveyed her property, the burden does not shift to defendants
to prove her competency to sell the property.
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The rest of

plaintiff's arguments rely on this faulty premise and must,
therefore, also fail.
Although defendants did not have the burden to prove
that plaintiff was competent to contract, the trial court
found, that in the event the defendants did have this burden
because of the subsequent guardianship appointment, the
evidence sufficiently showed that the plaintiff was in fact
competent to contract at the time she sold her property and
signed the deed.

(Judgment, Law I.)

Even assuming that defendants did have the burden to
prove plaintiff's competency to contract, plaintiff is also
wrong in construing Utah law to require them to prove she also
had the ability to make a "rational decision."

The test for

determining the mental capacity to contract in Utah, as set
forth in Anderson v. Thomas, 108 Utah 252, 260, 159 P.2d 142,
146 (1945) which was cited by plaintiff, states as follows:
Were the mental faculties so deficient or
impaired that there was not sufficient power
to comprehend the subject of the contract,
its nature and its probable consequences,
and to act with discretion in relation
thereto.
Plaintiff relies on Restatement (Second) of
Contracts, § 15, to claim that the test of incompetency
consists of a second part that relates to the ability to make a
rational decision.

No Utah case authority, however, is cited
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to show that Utah accepts the bifurcated approach advocated by
plaintiff or that the Utah test goes beyond the ability to
understand or act with discretion in relation to one's
understanding.
The test enunciated by the court in Anderson v.
Thomas was again relied upon by the court in Peterson v.
Carter, 579 P.2d 329 (Utah 1978).

After reciting the test as

set forth in Anderson, the court analyzed the evidence as
follows:
Mr. Harmon testified that after having
talked with Mrs. Peterson [the plaintiff],
and after her various questions about the
effect of the sale had been answered, "there
was no question in my mind that she knew
what she was doing and she wanted the home
to go to Mr, and Mrs. Carter [the
defendants]." After this meeting and before
the actual conveyance, Mr. Harmon contacted
one Anna Broadhead, Mrs. Peterson's closest
living relative, to inform her of the plans
to sell the property and to ask if there
were any objections. Mrs. Broadhead said
she thought it would be best to sell the
property. Although other testimony might
show Mrs. Peterson's incompetence, we are
inclined to defer to the trial court's
decision due to his proximity to the
situation and his ability to observe the
witnesses and their demeanor. [Emphasis

added.]
Id. at 331.

No analysis of Mrs. Peterson's ability to make a

"rational decision" was made by the court.

The obvious absence

of a rational decision analysis was again apparent in the only
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other Utah case that has relied on this test.

In Anderson v.

Brinkerhoff, 756 P.2d 95 (Utah App. 1988), the court merely
stated in its analysis "there is no evidence that [the
plaintiff] was unable to understand the nature of the
proceedings or was unable to transact business."

Id. at 100.

The test repeatedly used in determining the competency
of a person to contract in Utah has not been construed to
include a second part that requires a showing of inability to
make a "rational decision" in addition to lack of
understanding.

Assuming, therefore, that defendant had the

burden to prove plaintiff's competency to contract, defendant
was not required under Utah law to present evidence that
plaintiff was also able to make a "rational decision."
In addition, plaintiff's challenge of Le R Burton's
and Agnes Freebairn's testimony that she was in fact competent
and knew what she was doing at the time she sold her property
is insufficient to disturb this finding.

The trial judge is in

the best position to judge the credibility of these witnesses'
statements.

Jensen v. Brown, 639 P.2d 150, 152 (Utah 1981).

Likewise, plaintiff's inferences, drawn from Herbert Halliday's
testimony, is no support for rejecting the trial court's
finding that any presumption of incompetency was overcome by
the evidence.

It is the trial court's prerogative, not

plaintiff's, to draw or reject inferences, and its conclusions
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will not be disturbed on appeal.

Movie Films, Inc. v. First

Security Bank of Utah, 22 Utah 2d 1, 5, 447 P.2d 38, 40
(1968).
Plaintiff's final argument that the trial court's
finding cannot stand because Mr. Scott took a different
position in a prior proceeding is also erroneous.

Defendants'

present position, and the trial court's finding, is that
plaintiff was competent to contract at the time she sold her
property in 1971.

The prior proceeding plaintiff now refers to

is Weinstocks v. Mary Jean Freebairn,

wherein Mr. Scott

asserted the defense of incompetency to contract, on behalf of
plaintiff, against a claim that plaintiff contracted for goods
2
in 1981.
Certainly the issue of competency to contract in
1971 is not the same as competency in 1981.

Moreover,

plaintiff's reasoning that defendant cannot now claim plaintiff
was competent to contract in 1971 is faulty because she

The Answer attached as Appendix F to Appellant's Brief,
from which plaintiff argues that Mr. Scott is taking a position
which is different from an earlier position raised in a
judicial proceeding, is not a part of the record below, and
cannot now be brought before this court and used by plaintiff.
In order to clarify the record, however, defendants are
attaching as the Addendum the Complaint to which the Answer
responded.
2
Id. The Complaint alleges at paragraph 2 that goods
were sold and delivered between January 1, 1981 and December
31, 1981.
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misconstrues the court's statement in Condas v. Condas, 618
P.2d 491, 496 (Utah 1980) which she cites in support of this
claim.

The rule that a party cannot take a different position

in a subsequent judicial proceeding applies only where the
party previously obtained relief on the basis of the prior
position.

Id.; see also Blonquist v. Frandsen, 694 P.2d

595, 596 (Utah 1984).

Plaintiff has not shown, or even argued,

that defendant obtained relief on the basis of the defense
3
asserted in the Weinstock's action.
Plaintifffs arguments, which fail to show how the
court's findings are erroneous, also fail to provide any viable
reason for finding plaintiff to be incompetent to contract when
she agreed to sell her property in 1971.

Substantial evidence,

on the other hand, supports the trial court's findings that
plaintiff was competent to contract.
Defendants presented the testimony of Dr. John L.
Malouff, a clinical psychologist, who stated that he tested
plaintiff's "verbal intelligence."

Dr. Malouff testified that

this test dealt with plaintiff's "ability to reason," among

Although this issue is not properly before this court,
defendants further inform the court, in order to clarify the
baseless nature of plaintiff's argument, that Mr. Scott in fact
paid Weinstock's on this claim. Hence, no relief was obtained
upon the defense that plaintiff was incompetent to contract in
1981.
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other things.

(Record pp. 481-82.)

Plaintiff received a high

enough score on this test to put her the ninety-nine plus
percentile.

(Record p. 483.)

When asked his opinion as to

plaintiff's ability, in the 1970-71 time period, to transact
business, Dr. Malouff stated that plaintiff "would have
adequate knowledge to know if she was selling something, what
she was selling, what she was receiving for it, those sorts of
specifics."

(Record p. 497.)

Agnes Freebairn, plaintiff's sister-in-law, also
testified that plaintiff had accumulated bills, and that
plaintiff told her that she needed the money from selling the
property to pay her debts.

(Record pp. 525-26, 533.)

Both

Agnes Freebairn and plaintiff, consequently, then went to Le R
Burton to have the property offered for sale.

( Id-)

Mr.

Burton testified that plaintiff set the actual purchase price.
(Record p. 690.)

Mr. Burton further testified that he had been

involved in several prior transactions, during 1967 to 1970,
wherein plaintiff sold real property in order to obtain money
to pay her financial obligations.

(Record pp. 666-75.)

He

also stated that plaintiff conducted herself like other sellers
he had been involved with, except that she was more demanding
as to detailed information.

(Record p. 666.)

Agnes Freebairn

also testified that plaintiff handled their discussions with
Mr. Burton and that plaintiff acted very business-like.
(Record pp. 529, 532.)
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When the property did not sell, it was plaintiff1s
idea to ask Mr. Scott to purchase the property, which offer Mr.
Scott initially refused.

(Record p. 527.)

Mr. Burton also

testified that it was plaintiff's idea to put the proceeds from
the sale into a trust, and that plaintiff worked out the
details with her attorney, LaMar Duncan.

(Record pp. 695-99.)

Moreover, both Agnes Freebairn and Mr. Burton testified that
plaintiff did not discuss matters reflecting her paranoia
during their meetings pertaining to the sale of the property.
(Record pp. 532-33, 666, 670, 675, 687.)
This evidence is sufficient to support the trial
court's findings that plaintiff had the capacity to enter into
a binding contract.

Even if defendants had the burden of

proof, therefore, the trial court's finding that they met the
burden is supported by substantial evidence and should not be
disturbed.
B.

THE EVIDENCE ALSO SUPPORTS THE FINDING
THAT DEFENDANTS DID NOT EXERCISE FRAUD
OR UNDUE INFLUENCE OVER PLAINTIFF.

Plaintiff's arguments, made in Point III of
Appellant's Brief, are also unfounded and insufficient to upset
the trial court's findings.

Specifically, plaintiff claims

that a presumption of undue influence exists, which defendants
had the burden of rebutting, because of the "confidential
relationship" arising out of Mr. Scott's appointment as her
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guardian.

Plaintiff's entire argument, consequently, is

predicated on the existence of a confidential relationship.
Plaintiff, however, was unable to prove that a confidential
relationship existed.
While ignoring that the guardianship proceedings did
not occur until after plaintiff had entered into a binding
contract to sell her property, as discussed under Point I,
supra, plaintiff argues that the guardian-ward relationship
creates a confidential relationship as a matter of law.
In support of this argument, plaintiff cites Blodgett
v. Martsch, 590 P.2d 298, 302 (Utah 1978).

This case was

criticized, however, in Estate of Jones v. Jones, 759 P.2d
345, 348 (Utah 1988) on the very language upon which plaintiff
relies.

Moreover, neither Blodgett or any other Utah case

supports the specific proposition that a guardian-ward
relationship is a confidential relationship, as a matter of
law, for purposes of analyzing undue influence over contracting
parties.

It should be pointed out that plaintiff miscites
Berrett v. Stevens, 690 P.2d 553 (Utah 1984) for the
proposition that a rebuttable presumption of undue influence
exists over transactions between those in a confidential
relationship. Although defendants do not refute this principle
of law, the Berrett case is totally inapplicable and adds no
support to plaintiff's arguments.
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The court, in Bradbury v. Rasmussen, 16 Utah 2d 378,
401 P.2d 710 (Utah 1965), which is also relied upon by
plaintiff, is quite clear in defining what is necessary for a
confidential relationship.

The Bradbury Court stated that

there must be "that degree of confidence in the other party
which largely results in the substitution of the will of the
later for that of the former in the material matters involved
in the transaction/*

Bradbury, 401 P.2d at 713.

In

Bradbury, the court reversed the finding of a confidential
relationship where the evidence revealed that each party was
free to act on their own independent volition and will.
at 714.

Id.

Furthermore, this holding was in light of the court's

finding that there was "sincere affection, trust and
confidence" between the parties.

Id. at 713.

The only specific evidence plaintiff relies on in
support of her claim that there was a confidential relationship
is found on page 45 of Appellantfs Brief.

There is no doubt

that the most plaintiff has shown is that she trusted
defendant, and because of that trust she sold him her property
and later entered into a guardian-ward relationship.
Plaintiff, therefore, has clearly failed to show how she
substituted Mr. Scott's will for that of her own.

Hence,

plaintiff did not meet her burden of establishing the existence
of a confidential relationship, and defendants were not
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required to rebutt any presumption of undue influence.

The

trial court's refusal to find for plaintiff on this issue,
therefore, should not be disturbed.
Although the trial court did not find that a
confidential relationship existed, it did find that if there
was a confidential relationship, and hence, a presumption of
undue influence, that defendants successfully rebutted the
presumption.

(Judgment, Law II and Conclusion 11 3.)

Plaintiff

challenges this finding on the grounds that the transaction was
"unfair."

In essence, plaintiff claims that the trial court's

findings should be set aside because the sales price for
plaintiff's property should have been higher.
The narrow issue pertaining to the value of the
property does not affect the trial court's overall finding that
defendants did not exercise fraud or undue influence over
plaintiff.

Moreover, the trial court found that the property

was valued at $3,100 to $5,500.
IF 24.)

(Judgment, Findings of Fact

Plaintiff's own expert appraised it at $5,000.

pp. 597-600; Appellant's Brief p. 46.)

(Record

Hence, the trial

court's findings are consistent with plaintiff's own evidence.
In addition, plaintiff's claims as to the
inadmissibility of certain evidence pertaining to the value of
the property are not well grounded since the trial court was
apparently not adversely influenced.
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Also, plaintiff cannot

successfully challenge the trial court's findings on the
grounds that evidence was wrongfully admitted, because
evidentiary issues are not criticized in trials to a judge as
they are in trials to a jury.

In Del Porto v. Nicolo, 27 Utah

2d 286, 495 P.2d 811 (1972), the court stated:
When the trial is to the court, the rulings
upon admissibility of evidence are not required
to be so strict, nor are they of such critical
importance as where the trial is to the jury.
This is so because it is assumed that the trial
judge has superior knowledge as to the
competency and effect which should be given
evidence, and that he will make his findings
and decision in conformity therewith.
Id., 495 P.2d at 814.

Plaintiff, therefore, is not entitled

to have the trial court's findings regarding lack of fraud or
undue influence set aside based on the trial court's admission
of certain evidence pertaining to the limited issue of the
proper value of plaintiff's property.
In addition to the specific evidence discussed under
subsection A of this Point, there is evidence to establish that
plaintiff approached Mr. Burton to sell her property, and in
fact the property was advertised for sale before Mr. Scott knew
anything of plaintiff's need for money and desire to sell the
property.

(Record pp. 526-28, 676-690.)

Moreover, plaintiff

established the price for which the property was sold, without
any counter-offer by Mr. Scott.

(Record pp. 690-92.)

Plaintiff also realized that Mr. Scott did not want to purchase
her property and asked Mr. Burton to continue to advertise the
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property in the multiple real estate listings, on signs, and in
newspapers for three additional months before she had the
Earnest Money Agreement prepared for Mr. Scott's signature.
(Record pp. 680-92.)

Only one other offer to purchase was made

to plaintiff, which she rejected because the purchase price was
too low.

(Record p. 682.)
Defendants' evidence is clearly sufficient to support

the trial court's findings that plaintiff made up her own mind
to sell the property; that she affirmatively acted to contact
Mr. Burton and did all she could to have the property sold;
that she established the sales price; that she sought out Mr.
Scott to purchase the property; and that the sales price was
fair and consistent with the market value at the time.
(Judgment, Findings of Fact 1T1T 10-12, 23-24, 31.)

The trial

court's conclusion that defendants did not take advantage of
plaintiff, perpetrate a fraud upon her or exercise undue
influence over her by purchasing her property, and that
defendants rebutted any presumption of undue influence, should
be affirmed.
POINT III
PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO OBTAIN RELIEF
FROM THIS COURT UNDER A CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST
THEORY.
Plaintiff's final argument is that this court should
impose a constructive trust on the proceeds of Mr. Scott's sale
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of the land which he received in trade for the property he
purchased from plaintiff.

This argument must be rejected for

several reasons, as stated below.
For her statement of Utah law pertaining to
constructive trusts, plaintiff relies on Parks v. Zions First
National Bank, 673 P.2d 590, 599 (Utah 1983).
however, merely cites dicta.

Plaintiff,

The analysis used by the Parks

Court in determining whether a constructive trust should be
imposed in a particular situation, which plaintiff did not
discuss in her brief, was whether the defendant would be
"unjustly enriched" by retaining sole ownership over the
property, which in turn depended on whether the plaintiff had
an "equitable interest" in the property.

Id. at 600; accord

Close v. Adams, 657 P.2d 1351, 1352-53 (Utah 1983) (a
constructive trust is an equitable remedy to prevent unjust
enrichment).

Plaintiff has failed to argue, or even recognize,

these essential elements for a constructive trust.
The trial court did not enter a finding upon whether a
constructive trust should be imposed.

The trial courtfs

findings against plaintiff on the issues pertaining to the
validity of the sale rendered it unnecessary for the court to
enter specific findings on whether plaintiff was entitled to
relief on the theory of a constructive trust.
In addition, a constructive trust cannot be imposed by
this court because plaintiff has failed to show that the trial
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court erred in its findings against plaintiff.

Since plaintiff

has failed to state sufficient grounds for setting aside the
trial court *s holding of no cause of action, she is therefore
unable to now show entitlement to a constructive trust.

Cf.

Carnesecca v. Carnesecca, 572 P.2d 708, 710 (Utah 1977)
(constructive trusts normally arise out of fraud or breach of
fiduciary duty).
Furthermore, a constructive trust cannot be found by
this court without findings of fact in support thereof.

In

Park v. Zions First National Bank, the inverse situation was
presented where the defendants1 appealed from a judgment
holding there to be a constructive trust.

The defendants

argued on appeal that the trial court did not enter findings
with respect to the elements of a constructive trust.
673 P.2d at 601.

Park,

The trial court stated that under Rule 52(a)

of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, findings of fact "must
resolve all issues of material fact necessary to justify the
conclusions of law and judgment entered thereon."

Id.

Although defendant's argument was considered to be well
founded, the court reviewed the findings and held that they in
fact supported the judgment.

In the case at bar, there are no

findings to support the imposition of a constructive trust.
Consequently, even if the findings of the trial court
pertaining to liability were found to be in error, there would
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be no basis in the record for this court to find that all the
necessary elements for a constructive trust were proven at
trial.
In addition, this court should refrain from making
specific findings of fact pertaining to the elements of a
constructive trust.

The Utah Supreme Court has stated that it

will normally refrain from making findings of fact.

Bill Nay

& Sons Excavating v. Neeley Construction Co., 677 P.2d 1120,
1123 (Utah 1984); see also Gillmor v. Gillmor, 745 P.2d 461,
462 (Utah App. 1987)(it is not the function of an appellate
court to make findings of fact because it does not have the
advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses testify).

There

is no pressing need for this court to enter its own findings of
fact and it should refrain, therefore, from second guessing the
trial court's review and interpretation of the evidence.
Plaintiff is not entitled to the relief she seeks from
this court.

Her claim for recovery under a constructive trust

theory, therefore, should be rejected.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff has failed to clearly state the relief she
is seeking from this court.

To the extent plaintiff seeks to

have this court reverse the trial court's judgment or set aside
any of its findings, whether to support a reversal or remand,
plaintiff has failed to express any viable reason in her
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lengthy brief to support such relief.

Based upon the foregoing

arguments, it is apparent that plaintifffs appeal is not well
taken, and she should not be granted any relief thereon.
Defendants request, therefore, that plaintiff be
denied any relief she may seek through this appeal, and that
the judgment of the trial court below be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 13th day of March, 1989.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
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Casey K. McGarvey
Attorneys for Defendants
50 South Main, Suite 1600
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10 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 322-5555

O f(oC (1

CLERK OF THE CIRCUIT COURT
SALT LAKE DIVISION

CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE CITY DEPARTMENT
oooOooo
THE CARTER HAWLEY HALE STORE,
INC.f dba WEINSTOCK'S,

COMPLAINT

Plaintiff,
vs.
Civil No. «?•;

c^-Vs^o

MARY JEAN FREEBAIRN,
Defendant,
oooOooo
COMES NOW the plaintiff and complains of the defendant and
alleges as follows:
1.

The defendant is a resident of Salt Lake County,

State of Utah.
2.

Defendant is indebted to the plaintiff in the sum of

One Thousand Five Hundred and Twenty-Six Dollars and Three Cents
($1,526.03) for goods and materials sold and delivered between
the approximate dates of January 1, 1981, and December 31, 1981,
together with interest thereon from and after the first day of/
January, 1982, at the rate of eighteen percent (18%) per annum on
the first one thousana collars and twelve percent (12%) per annum
on the balance of the obligation.

3.

Pursuant to written agreement, a copy of which is

attached hereto and by this reference made a part hereof, the
defendant agreed to pay reasonable attorney's fee; a reasonable
attorney's fee would be one third of the amount found by the
court to be due and owing.
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays judgment against the defendant
in the sum of $1,526.03, together with interest thereon from and
after the first day of January, 1982 at the rate of 18% per annum
for the first one thousand dollars and 12% per annum for the
amount in excess of one thousand dollars, for attorney's fees
equal to one third of the amount found by the court to be due and
owing, for costs of court herein incurred, and for general
relief.
DATED this

Plaintiff's address;
1701 Arden Way
Sacramento, California

day of June, 1982.
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